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Abstract
Broad representation of different ethnic groups has implications in stability and 
the quality of democracy. The right to political participation is largely realized 
through the electoral system of a country. The choice among electoral systems 
should thus take various factors into account including the need for securing 
equitable representation, including minority groups. It is argued that the ‘first 
past the post system embodied in Ethiopia’s electoral law denies national and 
regional minorities equitable and adequate share of political power in the 
respective federal and regional councils. Hence, taking into consideration 
Ethiopia’s long history of competing ethnic nationalisms and lack of consensus, 
there is the need for securing adequate representation proportional to the 
numerical presence of minorities in constituencies in lieu of stubborn adherence 
solely to the majoritarian plurality system.
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Introduction
Electoral system design is a key mechanism in the broader institutional design 
approach to the resolution of conflict in multiethnic societies.* 1 This requires the 
development of electoral systems so that democracies can function properly.2 
Elections, not only enable citizens to elect political leadership, but also provide
* Lecturer at Hawassa University, College of Law and Governance, School of Law.
1 Stefan Wolf, Electoral Systems Design and Power Sharing Schemes in Ian O’Flynn 
and David Russell (eds.), 2005, Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, 
(Chase Publishing Services Ltd.), p. 59.
2 Jack Bielasiak (2002), “The Institutionalization of Electoral Party Systems in Post 
Communist States”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 34, No. 2, (Jan 2002), p. 189.
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the mechanism through which people can exercise control over their government 
officials.3
The electoral system adopted by a country depends more on its political 
culture rather than any abstract consideration into the relative merits of different 
voting methods.4 For example, countries with British political heritage are more 
inclined to plurality and majority systems, while those influenced by continental 
Europe have been more inclined towards proportional systems.5 It is also 
determined by how a country’s political life is organized, taking into account 
issues such as ethnicity, religion or a secular identity.
The right to political participation, which is a fundamental human right, 
especially, as applied to citizens of a country, should be implemented by the 
electoral system of a country to assure the equitable representation of 
minority groups. This article deals with the right to political participation of 
minorities in Ethiopia from the vantage point of the electoral system adopted. 
I argue that, the voting methods espoused as well as the electoral law’s 
language requirement for political empowerment of ethnic groups have not 
provided a favourable atmosphere for minorities found both at the federal 
and regional levels with respect to their right to political participation.
The first section of the article highlights the types of electoral systems that 
exist in the world today. Section 2 briefly discusses how ethnicity as a mode of 
political organization gained momentum and reached its political maturity in 
Ethiopia. The article further discusses the nexus between electoral systems and 
minority rights in the third section. This is further supported by Section 4 in 
which an attempt is made to show how ethnic group determination and minority 
right assertion took root in the Ethiopian federal system. Although general 
reference is made to the federal and regional levels, the article discusses 
regional minorities in the context of regional states. Section 5 addresses the right 
to political participation in the context of Ethiopia’s electoral system. The 
implication of the demand by several ethnic groups of their right to political 
participation is discussed under section 6, followed by the last section which 
deals with the way forward with regard to some of the issues.
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3 Benjamin Reilly (2006), Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in The Asia- 
Pacific, Oxford University Press, pp. 97-100.
4 Arend Lijphart (2008), Thinking About Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule 
in Theory and Practice, (Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group), p. 160.
5 Ibid.
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1. Electoral Systems: A Brief Overview
Electoral systems may vary along three generic dimensions: “the ballot 
structure, the district structure and the electoral formula”.6 The ballot structure 
determines how citizens cast their votes and how their votes are counted. This 
structure mainly focuses on five distinct features. The entities for which citizens 
may vote, the number of votes that they cast for these entities, the category of 
votes cast, the ballot system and to the extent to which relevant vote totals are 
affected by the votes cast.7
The district structure refers to the numbers, hierarchy, and magnitude of the 
electoral districts used in the system. An electoral district is defined as “a 
geographical area within which votes are aggregated and seats allocated.” There 
may be one single national electoral district or many. With multiple districts, 
this structure may be allocated to a single tier or organized hierarchically into 
multiple lower and upper tiers.8 Finally, there is the electoral formula which 
determines how votes are translated into seats. The most basic and well known 
formulas are the majority, proportional representation and mixed systems.9
As Moster observes, “[t]he existence of significant ethnic cleavages have 
long held states in an insurmountable difficulty of maintaining democracy and 
the task has been even harder in emerging democracies”.10 For this purpose, 
different states have sought different mechanisms on how to overcome these 
obstacles and successfully implant democracy in the face of deep ethnic 
cleavages.11
To this end, achieving broad representation of different ethnic groups has 
important implications for the stability and quality of democracy. Legislative 
representation carries powerful symbolic power for ethnic minorities and often 
becomes an end in itself even when minorities have little or no chance of 
participating in the governing coalition.12
Electoral systems dictate how votes are counted into seats and they have a 
number of pragmatic applications which were very much contentious in many 
countries during the 1990’s, and this has given prominence to the issue thereby
6 Jan Teorell and Catharina Lindstedt (2010), “Measuring Electoral Systems ”, Political 
Research Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 2, (June 2010), p. 435.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Robert G Moster (2008), “Electoral Systems and the Representation of Ethnic 
Minorities: Evidence from Russia”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3, (April 
2008), p. 273.
11 ibid.
12 Ibid.
elevating it from the margin to the mainstream in the political agenda.13 The 
following section briefly outlines the main variations in electoral systems.
1.1 Classification of Electoral Systems
The majoritarian system includes plurality, second ballot, and alternative voting. 
The proportional and semi-proportional systems inculcate the single transferable 
vote, the limited vote including open and closed party lists using largest 
remainders and highest average formula. The third type is the mixed system, 
such as the additional members system thereby combining majoritarian and 
proportional elements.14
1.1.1 Majoritarian electoral systems
This is by far the oldest electoral system, dating back at least to the twelfth 
century, and also is the simplest.15 This category can be subdivided into those 
requiring candidates to win a simple majority, or an absolute majority (50+ 
percent) of votes to be elected.16
a) Plurality system
In the plurality system, otherwise known as “first-past-the post” or “winner 
takes all”, candidates usually do not need to pass a minimum threshold of votes. 
Nor do they require an absolute majority to be elected. Instead, all they need is a 
simple plurality, that is, one more vote than their closest rival.17 Hence, for 
example, in seats where the vote splits almost equally among three candidates, 
the winning candidate may have only 35 percent of the vote, while the other 
contestants get 34 and 31 percent respectively. Although two-thirds of the votes 
in this example have supported other candidates, the plurality of votes is decisive.
In this system, the party share of parliamentary seats or their share of the 
popular vote does not count for the formation of government. The government 
may also be elected without an all out plurality of votes as long as it has the 
parliamentary majority.18 A “manufactured majority” is thereby created, in 
effect exaggerating the share of seats for the leading party in order to produce an 
effective working parliamentary majority for the government, while
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13 Pippa Norris (1997), “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and 
Mixed Systems”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, Contrasting 
Political Institutions (July 1997), p. 298.
14 Id, p. 299
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Id, 299-301
18 Ibid, See also, Ram Mudambi et. al, Plurality versus Proportional Representation: 
An Analysis of Sicilian Elections, Public choice, Vol. 86, No. 3/4, pp. 341-357
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simultaneously penalizing minor parties, especially those whose support is 
spatially dispersed.
The simple plurality voting system focuses on effective governance, not 
representation of all minority views. As Norris observes:
the country is divided into territorial single member constituencies, voters 
within each constituency cast a single ballot for one candidate, the candidate 
with the largest share of the vote in each district assumes the seat of the 
office; and in turn the party with an overall majority of seat forms the
government.19
b) Second ballot/ majority run-offs system
This system tries to ensure that the winning candidate gets an overall majority of 
votes. Candidates obtaining an absolute majority of votes (50+ percent) in the 
first round are declared elected.20 If this is not the case, a second round run-off is 
held between the top two candidates who got the highest number of votes. The 
aim of run-off election is to consolidate support behind the victor, and to 
encourage broad cross party coalition-building and alliances in the final stages 
of the campaign.21
c) Alternative vote
Another majoritarian system is the “alternative vote” in which the voters rank 
their preferences among candidates instead of a simple “X” mark on their 
choice. in order to win, candidates need an absolute majority of votes. Where no 
candidate gets over 50 percent after first preferences are counted, then the 
candidate at the bottom of the pile with the lowest share of the vote is 
eliminated, and the votes are redistributed amongst the other candidates.22 The 
process henceforth continues until an absolute majority is secured. “This process 
translates a close lead into a more decisive majority of seats for the leading party 
however, systematically discriminating against those of the bottom of the poll in 
order to promote effective government for the winner”.23
19 Norris, supra note 13, p. 299-301
20 David T. Canon (1999), “Electoral Systems and the Representation of Minority 
Interests in Legislatures”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24 No. 23 pp 335-339
21 Ibid.
22 Norris, supra note 13, p. 299-301.
23 Ibid.
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1.1.2 Proportional representation
Party lists system
Where majoritarian systems emphasize governability, proportional systems 
focus on the inclusion of minority voices.24 Proportional electoral systems based 
on party lists in multi-member constituencies are widespread throughout the 
world. The principle of proportional representation is that the seats in a 
constituency are divided according to the number of votes cast for party lists, 
but there are considerable variations in how this is implemented in different 
systems.25
Party lists may be open, as in Norway, Finland, The Netherlands, and Italy. 
Under this system, “voters can express preferences for particular candidates 
within the list”; or they may be closed “as in Israel, Portugal, Spain, and 
Germany, in which case voters can only select the party, and the ranking of 
candidates is determined by the political party”.26 The rank order on the party 
list determines which candidates are elected, for example, the top ten to fifteen 
names.
Party lists may also be national “as in Israel, where all the country is one 
constituency divided into 120 seats. But most party lists are regional, as in 
Belgium where there are seven regions each sub-divided into between 2 and 34 
seats”.27 The electoral formula varies among systems. Votes can be allocated to 
seats based on the highest averages method. This requires the number of votes 
for each party to be divided successively by a series of divisors, and seats are 
allocated to parties that secure the highest resulting quotient, up to the total 
number of seats available.28
There are a number of formulas available to undertake the task of dividing 
and allocating seats. “The most widely used is the d'Hondt formula, using 
divisors (such as 1, 2, 3, etc.)”.29 In contrast, the ‘pure’ Sainte-Lague method 
divides the votes with odd numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, etc.). The ‘modified’ Sainte- 
Lague replaces the first divisor by 1.4 but is otherwise identical to the pure 
version. Another option is the largest remainder method, which uses a minimum 
quota calculated in a number of ways. In the Hare quota, used in Denmark and
24 Burt L. Monroe (1995), “Fully Proportional Representation”, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, p. 925-927.
25 Ibid.
26 Norris, supra note 13, p. 303.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 See generally. Michael Gallagher (1992), “Comparing Proportional Representation 
Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities ”, British Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 22, No. 4, (October 1992), p. 469-496.
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Costa Rica, “the total number of valid votes in each constituency is divided by 
the total number of seats” to be allocated. The Droop quota, used in South 
Africa and Greece, “raises the divisor by the number of seats plus one, 
producing a slightly less proportional result”.30
1.1.3 Semi-proportional systems
a) Cumulative and limited vote
Semi-proportional systems provide another option, including the cumulative 
vote, where citizens are given as many votes as representatives, and where votes 
can be cumulated on a single candidate.31 In contrast to this, there is also the 
limited vote, which somehow is similar to the cumulative vote, but voters are 
given fewer votes than the number of members to be elected.32
b) Single Transferable Vote
The system in this category divides the country into multi-member 
constituencies in which each constituency will have four or five representatives. 
Parties put forward as many candidates as they think could win in each 
constituency. Voters rank their preferences among candidates (1, 2, 3, 4...). The 
total number of votes is counted, and then this total is divided by the number of 
seats in the constituency to produce a quota. To be elected, candidates must 
reach the minimum quota.33 “When the first preferences are counted, if no 
candidate reaches the quota, then the person with the least number of votes is 
eliminated, and their votes are redistributed according to second preferences. 
This process continues until all seats are filled”. 34
1.1.4 Mixed systems
Many arrangements such as those adopted in Italy, New Zealand, and Russia, 
use mixed systems with variation in designs.35 The Additional Member System 
used in Germany combines single-member and party list constituencies. Electors 
have two votes. “Half the members of the Bundestag are elected in single­
member constituencies based on a simple plurality of votes”.36 The remaining 
MPs are elected from closed party lists in each region. “Parties which receive
30 Ibid.
31 Id, 302.
32 Ibid.
33 id, p. 303.
34 Ibid.
35 Norris, supra note 13, p. 303, See also, Gary, W. Cox and Mattehew Soberg Shugart 
(1996), “Strategic Voting Under Proportional Representation”, Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, Vol. 12, No. 2, (October 1996), pp. 299-324.
36 Ibid.
less than a specified minimum threshold of list votes (5 percent) are not entitled 
to any seats”. 37
1.2 An Overview of the Ethiopian Approach
Article 56 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia38 
provides that “a Political Party or a Coalition of Political Parties that has the 
greatest number of seats in the House of People's Representatives [HoPR] shall 
form the executive and lead it”. The Constitution further stipulates that members 
of the HoPR shall be elected from candidates in each electoral district by a 
plurality of the votes cast.39
This has further been corroborated by the amended Electoral Law of 
Ethiopia, which states that “a Candidate who received more votes than other 
Candidates within a Constituency shall be declared the winner”.40 Therefore 
Ethiopia follows the plurality system under which the candidate who receives 
more votes than other competitors within a constituency is declared the winner. 
This applies to all elections conducted in Ethiopia which include: “General 
Election, Local Election, By-Election, Re-election and Referendum”.41
General Elections are conducted to elect members of the HoPR or State 
Councils conducted every five Years.42 These elections “shall be conducted 
throughout the country simultaneously. However, where the National Electoral 
Board finds it necessary and the House of Peoples' Representatives so decides, it 
may be conducted at different times”.43 In general elections, “only a single 
representative shall be elected to the Federal House of Peoples' Representatives 
from a constituency”.44
Local Elections are held at Zonal, Woreda, City Municipality and Sub-City 
or Kebele council levels.45 “The number of representatives elected in a
74_________________Mizan Law Review_______________ Vol. 7 No.1, September 2013
37 Ibid.
38 Proclamation No. 1/1995, Proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 1st Year No.1, Addis 
Ababa-21st August, 1995, adopted on 8th of December 1994 and came into force 
21st August 1995.
39 Id, Article 54(2)
40 Proclamation No 532/2007, The Amended Electoral Law of Ethiopia Proclamation, 
Federal Negarit Gazeta, 13th Year, No. 53, Addis Ababa, 25th June 2007, Article 25
41 Proclamation No 532/2007, Article 27.
42 Id, Article 28.
43 Id, Article 28(2).
44 Id, Article 28(3).
45 Id, Article 29(1).
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constituency for a local election shall be determined by laws of Regional States 
on the basis of the type of election and the number of seats in each council”.46 
The time for local elections “shall be determined in accordance with the laws of 
Regional States”.47 Local elections are conducted based on regulations and 
directives issued by the Board in accordance with the electoral proclamation.48
By-election is conducted when “the councils at different levels request the 
Board to replace council members whose mandates are terminated due to 
various reasons”;49 or when “a request for recall lodged in accordance with the 
law is accepted”.50 Moreover, it is a common practice to hold re-elections, 
mostly when there are election irregularities and complaints by the party or 
parties concerned.51 Re-election will be conducted when the Board decides in 
accordance with Article 7 (10) of the Proclamation; and where candidates 
receive equal votes in accordance with Article 76(3) of the Proclamation and 
where it becomes difficult to determine the winner.52
2. Antecedents to the Ethnicization of Politics in Ethiopia
Ethiopia has a long history of statehood with the ancient civilizations of the 
Abyssinian, Axumite and the Zagwe empires.53 However, the borders of the 
present day Ethiopia were mainly demarcated by the end of the 19th century and 
early 20th century.54 The process of centralization of state power which began 
since the reign of Emperor Tewodros II in the 1850’s marks the beginning of 
Ethiopia’s nation (empire) building. The subsequent rulers of the country 
pursued the same path.55
46 Id, Article 29(2).
47 Id, Article 29(3).
48 Id, Article 29(4).
49 Id, Article 30(1)(a).
50 Id, Article 30(1)(b).
51 Id, Article 31.
52 Id, Article 30(1)(a) & (b)
53 Kidane Mengisteab, New approaches to State Building in Africa: The Case of 
Ethiopia’s Ethnic-Based Federalism, African Studies Review, Vol. 40, No 3, (Dec 
1997), p.119.
54 See generally, Merera Gudina (2006), “Contradictory Interpretations of Ethiopian 
History: The Need for a New Consensus” in David Turton (ed.) Ethnic Federalism: 
The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (James Curry, Oxford).
55 Before the coming into power of Emperor Tewodros, the country had a non- 
centralized system of governance on what was termed as the reign of the Zamana 
Masafent; Assefa Fiseha (2007), Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in 
Ethiopia: A Comparative Study, (Rev.edn, Addis Ababa Artistic Printing Enterprise),
p. 16.
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The formation of the modern Ethiopian state can be described as involving 
three processes: “the centralization of power, the territorial expansion of the 
Shewan rulers and the European expansion in pursuit of colonizing Africa”.56 
The nation building strategy employed by many of the Ethiopian rulers was 
mainly concerned with centralizing state power and conquering and expanding 
territory which eventually gave the present day Ethiopia its current geographic 
and demographic shape. Especially, the territorial expansion of Menelik II 
towards the south, east, and west transferred the relatively homogenous 
Abyssinian Empire into a mosaic of different ethno-linguistic groups and 
diversified culture.
Ethnicity, which is now the sole organizing principle of political power, was 
considered a taboo during this period let alone to be taken as a means of 
political organization and mass mobilization.57 But this taboo was broken 
through the struggle of the Ethiopian student movement which, inter alia, 
addressed “the question of Nationalities”.58 The popular revolution of 1974 
finally deposed the Emperor from power through the machinery of his own 
military and the state was made secular.59
The Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), otherwise known 
as the Derg, took advantage of the revolution and ascended to power. The Derg 
promised the equality of all nationalities, a promise that was far from being 
realized.60 With the motto Ethiopia Tiqdem (Ethiopia First), the Derg pledged to 
maintain the established unitary character of the state and proclaimed Ethiopia’s 
indivisible unity. Promoting ethnic identity was then found to be a threat to the 
unity of the state; and in the face of various ethnic based armed movements 
fighting the Derg, the issue was further pushed aside. The Derg, which was 
strongly inspired by the ideas of the Ethiopian student movement, chose the 
Marxist/Leninist path. The country’s problems were expressed and reduced as 
class antagonism rather than ethnic/nationalist.61 It was this position of the Derg
56 Teshale Tibebu (1995), The Making of Modern Ethiopia 1896-1974, (Lawrence Vile, 
NI: The Red Sea Press, Inc,), p. 37.
57 Ibid.
58 Bahru Zewde (2001), A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, 2nd ed. (Athens, 
Ohio: Ohio University Press,), p. 225.
59 Teshale Tibebu, supra note 56, p. 167.
60 Equality at the time meant the end of cultural subordination and the freedom to 
exercise ones culture, but not the autonomy and self-government of the nationalities. 
See, John Markakis (2003), Ethnic Conflict in Pre-Federal Ethiopia, paper presented 
at the 1st National Conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, May 5-7, 
2003 , p.10.
61 John Young (1997), Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia-The Tigray’s People Liberation 
Front (Cambridge University Press), p. 61.
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that led to a further strengthening of the ethnic based movements which started 
armed struggle immediately after 1974.
As a result, the Derg came under increasing pressure from regional and 
ethnic movements. The intensification of ethnic (civil) wars in the country, the 
increasing resistance to military rule and the rise of militant regional and ethnic 
opposition movements compelled it to consider some kind of decentralization 
and seek a constitutional solution.62 The Institute of Nationalities was 
established whose main task was to draft a constitution which will reflect the 
ethnic makeup of the country with viable administrative divisions.63 Ethnicity in 
Ethiopia reached its political maturity generally during this period of Military 
rule. The major reasons include the growth and politicization of the 
intelligentsia (especially the leftist ideology), promotion of ethnic-cultural 
emancipation, the end of divinity and reference to the solomonic dynasty to 
legitimize political power, the proclamations which announced the equality of 
all groups and the right of nationalities to self-government, the mass literacy 
campaign and the introduction of local languages, the accounting of linguistic 
and religious diversity in the population census and the constitutional provisions 
of autonomous regions.64
Towards the end of its reign, the Derg granted autonomy to carefully selected 
provinces distressed by ethnic and nationalist strife.65 But this was an action 
taken very late in time to reverse the ethnic insurgencies and political instability 
of the country. Ethnic/nationalist movements were gaining prominence over the 
Derg.
From among the many ethnic based resistance movements, the one that 
played the decisive role in the ultimate demise of the Derg was the TPLF 
(Tigray Peoples Liberation Front). It was established in 1975 by students who 
were strongly influenced by the Ethiopian student movement and thus by the
62 Mehret Ayenew, Decentralization in Ethiopia: Two Case studies on Devolution of 
power and Responsibilities to local government in Bahru Zewde and Siegfried 
Pausewang (eds.) 2002, Ethiopia: The Challenge of Democracy from Below, 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, (Uppsala and Forum of Social Studies, Addis Ababa) pp. 
134-135.
63 The Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities was a political research bureau 
that did research work under the military regime. Most of the results from the 
institute’s research have been directly taken over under the post 1991 regime in the 
restructuring of the country via ethnicity. See John G. Abbink (1998), New 
Configurations of Ethiopian Ethnicity: The Challenge of the South, Northeast African 
Studies Vol. 5, No.1, pp. 62-63.
64 John Markakis, Supra note 60, p. 20.
65 For a discussion of the administrative divisions, their powers and boundaries at the 
time See, Assefa Fiseha, supra note 55, pp. 43-46.
ideas about ethnic problems.66 In the course of the liberation struggle, the TPLF 
decided to widen its objectives and to extend its actions to areas outside 
Tigray.67 Ultimately, the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic 
Front) which is a coalition of ethnically based parties was formed.
Finally, the ethnic/nationalist opposition movements were successful in 
overthrowing the repressive Derg dictatorship. Eventually, EPRDF proclaimed 
its intentions of doing away with the past and creating a new mode of state 
building in which the central agenda is ethnicity. A national conference was set 
up for this purpose in Addis Ababa form July 1-5, 1991 and it led to the signing 
of the Transitional Period Charter in which ethnic diversity and the right to self­
determination for all ethnic groups were recognized as core aspirations.
The EPRDF upheld ethnic issues as its central agenda during the transitional 
period which was followed by the promulgation of the new Constitution which 
was built by a marriage of ethnicity and federalism. Ethnic criteria played the 
major (probably the only) role in the reorganization of the country. This can be 
seen directly from the fact that the 1995 Constitution establishes nine regional 
states that are largely delimited along ethno-linguistic lines. indeed, the 
Ethiopian government has tried to realize a match between regional state 
delimitation and ethnic identity, which has relatively solved the problem of the 
different contending ethnic groups. On the other side of the spectrum, 
ethnicization of politics has also brought about new and unprecedented ethnic 
antagonisms and tension especially in the regional states.68
Federalism at the regional level, under the current ethnic federal structure is 
seriously questioned from the perspective of empowerment of the different 
resident ethnic groups especially minorities. The ethnically diversified character 
of the country is present at the regional state level as well. None of the 
ethnically framed nine regional states in the strictest sense can be termed as 
ethnically homogenous ones. This can simply be deduced from the fact that 
there exists more than eighty ethnic groups in the country but only nine regional 
states have so far been formed. To this effect, the Ethiopian approach of 
territorial accommodation of ethnic diversity has created a situation by which - 
especially at the regional level - the regionally dominant group considers the 
region as its property, in effect, threatening the political aspirations of other 
ethnic groups, thereby resulting in their political relegation.
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66 See, Young, supra note 61, p. 61-65.
67 Ibid.
68 For an excellent articulation of the problems See, Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha and 
Christophe Van Der Beken (2013), “Ethnic Federalism and Internal Minorities: The 
Legal Protection of Internal Minorities In Ethiopia ”, African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, 21.1 , pp. 32-49.
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3. The Electoral System and Minority Rights
It is believed that minority rights can best be “achieved and articulated through a 
combination of majority sensitivity and minority inclusion”.69 The inclusion of 
minorities in representative bodies is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of 
conflict prevention and longer-term conflict management. “There is not a single 
case of peaceful and democratic conflict avoidance in which the minority 
community is excluded from legislative representation”.70
Electoral systems are tools developed for organizing representative 
democracies. They are the mechanisms used to elect decision makers who 
represent citizens when societies become too large for every citizen to be 
involved in each decision that affects the community.71 However, elections can 
lead to uneven distribution of powers and most importantly to the 
marginalization and relegation of minority groups if they are not managed 
appropriately taking into consideration the specific needs of the electorate.
While there are some basic elements of participatory democracy present in 
all methods of electing leaders around the world, the details of electoral systems 
vary widely.72 The issue of adopting an electoral system largely depends upon 
the nature and character of the specific society. What works well in a 
homogenous society may not be so in multiethnic societies.
With regard to the protection of minorities, the electoral system may be used 
with two aims. “one is to ensure the adequate parliamentary representation of a 
minority, and the second is to increase the electoral influence of minority groups 
independently from representation”.73 Adequate parliamentary representation 
may be ensured through the choice of an electoral system while guaranteed 
representation of minority groups (mostly provided by legislative guarantees) 
could be undertaken by reserving some seats for minority groups to increase 
minority representation outside of electoral competition.
As discussed in the previous section, two main types of electoral systems 
generally dominate the world. These are majority systems and the proportional 
representation system. While the first one is characterized by the winner takes 
all in which a relative majority is sufficient to be declared the winner, the 
second electoral system gives primacy to a close relationship between the votes
69 Andrew Reynolds (2006), “Electoral Systems and the Protection and Participation of 
Minorities”, Minority Rights Group International, p. 3.
70 Ibid.
71 Id ,8.
72 Ibid.
73 J. A. Laponce (1957), “The Protection of Minorities by the Electoral System”, The 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 1957), p. 321.
cast and seats won proportionally.74 Electoral systems are generally defined and 
categorized with reference to representatives elected from each constituency 
district, the formula adopted (either plurality or proportionality of vote) and 
threshold of representation for parties or candidates (which can be determined 
by the law or by the number of seats).75
Ethiopia has adopted the “first-past-the-post” electoral system which simply 
states that one who receives the majority of votes within the electoral district is 
the winner.76 In practice, this means the one seat in each electoral district is won 
by the candidate who gets a simple comparable majority of votes in the district. 
in a country where the states are organized on ethnic lines and where none of 
these states are ethnically homogenous, the use of such electoral system runs the 
risk that the seat in each electoral district will be won by the candidate who 
represents the interest of the largest ethnic group in the district. This is 
particularly problematic for minorities that are to be found dispersed, which will 
eventually make them a minority in each electoral district.
In this regard, Horowitz maintains that “electoral systems have a huge role in 
fostering or retarding ethnic conflict”. He argues that the “delimitation of 
constituencies, the electoral principle, the number of members per constituency, 
and the structure of the ballot have a potential impact on ethnic alignments, 
ethnic electoral appeals, multi-ethnic coalitions, the growth of extremist parties, 
and policy outcomes”.77
Particularly, the electoral system harnessed to the goal of ethnic 
accommodation can be utilized to: fragment the support of one or more ethnic 
groups, especially a majority group, to prevent it from achieving permanent 
domination. This induces an ethnic group, especially a majority, to engage in 
inter-ethnic bargaining and encourage the formation of multiethnic coalitions. 
This consequently preserves “a measure of fluidity or multipolar balance among 
several groups to prevent bifurcation and the permanent exclusion of the 
resulting minority and reduce the disparity between votes won and seats won”.78
Taking this as a background regarding the need for minority protection and 
the necessity of choosing an appropriate electoral system to be adopted, a brief 
discussion about ethnic group determination and minority rights ascertainment 
in the Ethiopian context is made in the following section.
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4. Ethnic Group Determination and Minority Rights
As Eide notes, the issue of minority “can only occur in pluralistic societies, 
defined as societies in which significant diversity and dissimilarities exist”.79 
such issues “involve tensions between the state, on the one hand and religion, 
nationality, ethnicity, or culture, on the other”.80 This predicament at the same 
time may take up two forms. The first is the case in which the state solely serves 
the purpose of majorities and represses minorities, while the second situation is 
the case by which the state is unwilling to impartially protect minorities.81
Minority rights were first recognized in international relations, as specific 
solutions to transboundary conflicts. it was only afterwards that they were 
transferred to the domestic level.82 Despite the long history of the discourse on 
the protection of minorities, the clarity of relevant international legal standards 
on minorities still remains unsatisfactory.83 This is mainly attributed to the fact 
that there exists no binding definition on the concept of a minority as the holder 
of minority rights. Even though there is no binding definition in the international 
arena, an attempt has been made by different scholars to determine its scope of 
application and its right holders.
The most widely accepted definition of a minority is forwarded by the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti, who defines it as:
a ‘group’, numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non 
dominant position, whose members being nationals of a state possess ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the 
population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed 
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religions or language.84
This definition of a minority illustrates that persons belonging to such minority 
groups have the right to self-determination. Conceptually, “persons belonging to 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities meet the criteria for consideration as 
people in the context of the right to internal self-determination”.85 Such
79 Asbjorn Eide (1990), “Minority Situations: In Search of Peaceful and Constructive 
Solutions ”, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev, p. 132.
80 Ibid.
81 See, Ibid.
82 Ibid, p. 133.
83 Jungwon Park (2006), “Integration of Peoples and Minorities: An Approach to the 
Conceptual Problem of Peoples and Minorities with Reference to Self Determination 
under International law”, 13 Int’l J. on Minority and Group Rts., p. 69.
84 Francesco Capotorti (1979), Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.I., Paragraph 
568
85 Park, supra note 83, p. 93.
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understanding is paramount in expounding the rights of minorities because the 
effective realization of minority rights becomes possible and more secure with 
the normative basis of the right to self-determination.86 Deschnes added to the 
above definition one important factor, namely that “the minority’s aim is to 
achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law”.87
Even though it is not the purpose of this article to engage in the controversies 
of accurate definition for minorities, it will be worth commenting on the 
requirement that the group be numerically inferior has often been questioned as 
misguiding.88 No regional or international consensus has been reached toward 
establishing a universally acceptable notion of what constitutes a minority. 
Minority rights group international asserts that regardless of its demographic 
makeup, a group that is disempowered may be classified as a minority.89 
Therefore, as most commentators on the subject agree, the focus should be more 
on the non-dominant character of the group in which minorities are seen as the 
subordinate elements of the state.90
The enormous divergence in the numerical sizes of the various ethnic groups 
of Ethiopia, together with the lack of a majority at the country level, would 
obviously lead to the assumption that no ethnic or linguistic group can be 
considered as a majority at the federal level in the country.91 Apart from 
employing the term minority nationalities, the FDRE Constitution has not 
defined the term minority and it did not also identify which groups qualify as 
minorities. Rather, it simply states the defining criterion for an ethnic group in 
Article 39 as “nations, nationalities and peoples.” It defines ethnic groups 
(nation’s nationalities and peoples) as “a group of people who have or share a 
large measure of a common culture or similar custom, mutual intelligibility of 
language, belief in a common or related identity, a common psychological 
makeup, and an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory”.92
86 Ibid.
87 Shane Daray (2002), “The Rights of Minorities in States of Emergency”, 9 Int’l J. on 
Minority and Group Rts. p. 346.
88 In this regard the situation of the people of Oromo and that of white South Africans 
are typical examples respectively.
89 Stephanie Kodish, “Balancing Representation: Special Representation Mechanisms 
Addressing the Imbalance of Marginalized Voices in African Legislatures”, 30 
Sufflok Transnat’l L. Rev. (2006-2007), p. 21
90 See, Id, p. 34.
91 Aberra Dagafa (2008), “The Scope of Rights of National Minorities under the 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia”, Series on Ethiopian 
Constitutional law,Vol.1, pp. 104-105.
92 Article 39(5) of the FDRE Constitution.
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This seems to signify that the Constitution subscribes to the primordial ideas 
of ethnicity.93 Since the whole population of the country is seen as composed of 
nations, nationalities and peoples as defined above, it means that every citizen 
must belong to an ethnic group and define himself/herself along ethnic lines.94 
The Constitution also seems to have taken the presumption that ethnic groups 
live in geographically concentrated areas, that the regional states are inhabited 
by ethnic groups. This presupposes that they are homogenous and have the same 
interest and are equated with political units even though these assertions are not 
in conformity with the reality of the Ethiopian society.95
4.1 Minority Determination and Setting up of Electoral 
Constituencies
Neither ethnic nor linguistic minorities have been defined specifically under the 
1995 FDRE Constitution. Other than setting the standard criteria for designating 
a nation, a nationality or people, the constitution has not made any reference to 
the exact number of persons required by such a formulation. one may argue 
therefore that all nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia are entitled to 
enjoy equally all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution regardless of their 
numerical size.96
But under the Transitional Period Charter, the term “Nation” or “Nationality” 
was defined in Proclamation No 7/1992 as referring to a “people living in the 
same geographical area and having a common language and a common 
psychological makeup or identity”.97 The Proclamation defined ‘minority 
nationality’ as a nationality or people which cannot establish its own Woreda self 
government because of the small number of its population.98
Later on, Article 54(3) of the FDRE Constitution inserted the term “minority 
nationalities or peoples” without defining what is meant by the term. After the 
adoption of the Constitution, the term minority nationality was defined in
93 See, Lovise Aalen (2006), “Ethnic Federalism and Self-determination for 
Nationalities in a Semi-Authoritarian State: The Case of Ethiopia”, 13 Int’l .J. on 
Minority and Group Rts., pp. 246-247.
94 Id, 247.
95 Ibid.
96 Aberra Dagafa , supra note 91, p. 101-102.
97 Proclamation No 7/1992, A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of 
National /Regional Self-governments, Negarit Gazeta 51st Year No 2, Addis Ababa , 
14th January 1992, Article 2(7).
98 Id, Article 2(6); Cf Proclamation No 11/1992, A Proclamation to Provide for the 
Establishment of the National Regional and Woreda Councils Members Election 
Commission, Negarit Gazeta, 51st Year, No. 6, 8th February 1992, Article 2(5) 
defined minority in a similar way.
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Proclamation 111/1995 as “a community determined by the council of 
representatives or its successor to be of a comparatively smaller size of 
population than that of other nations/nationalities”.99
when one analyzes the definitions given under the preceding proclamations 
in light of the Article 54(3) of the Constitution, it seems that ‘minority 
nationality’ refers merely to those particular ethnic groups that do not have 
sufficient number of people to make up a constituency so as to have their own 
representatives in the House of Peoples Representatives (HoPR). Thus, as per 
Article 15(2) of Proclamation No. 111/1995, since each electoral constituency is 
made up of 100,000 inhabitants, an ethnic group below such a requirement may 
be considered as a ‘minority nationality’ and accordingly, the HoPR may permit 
such group to have special representation in the HoPR.100
However, Proclamation No. 111/1995 has been replaced by Proclamation 
No. 532/2007. Unlike Proclamation No. 111/1995, the new proclamation does 
not base an electoral constituency on a fixed number of population but rather 
states that the number of constituencies is to be determined based on the 
population census of the country.101 Electoral constituencies now do not have a 
fixed numerical threshold. instead, considerations are made generally taking 
into account the population size of the country.
Therefore, it can be discerned that there is no minimum numerical 
requirement that an ethnic group should meet to be considered a minority. This 
proclamation has not defined what is meant by minority nationalities and 
secondly, it has left the issue of determining the numerical size of an electoral 
constituency based on the population size of the country rather than setting a 
predetermined figure. Nevertheless, one can deduce that, a minority nationality 
is one which cannot establish its own electoral constituency whatever the 
number of the group. The Proclamation addresses the issue of ascertaining 
minority nationalities using a modality which is different from its predecessor. it 
states that “minority nationalities which require special representation shall be 
determined on the basis of clear criteria” set in advance by the House of 
Federation.102 However, what is meant by ‘clear criteria’ is ambiguous.
One may argue that a nation, nationality and people should refer only to 
those groups that can form their own electoral constituency. This would in effect 
mean that minority nationalities are within the emblem of nation, nationality or 
people. While the former can exercise the right to self-determination, the latter
See, Proclamation No 111/1995, A Proclamation to Make the Electoral Law of 
Ethiopia Conform to the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, Negarit Gazeta, 54th Year, No. 9, 23rd February 1995 Article 2(3).
102
See, Aberra Dagafa , supra note 91, p. 101-102.
See, Proclamation No 532/2007, Article 20(1) (b).
See, Proclamation No 532/2007, Article 20 (1) (d).
99
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are not capable of exercising such right due to their numerical inferiority except 
through the mechanism of special representation.
in a similar fashion, it can be argued that, minority groups are those which 
are not represented in the House of Federation (HoF) because of their inability 
to fulfill the requirement of one million population.103 Hence, an ethnic group 
that constitutes less than one million people could also be considered as 
minority at least for the purpose of political representation. During the 1994 
population and housing census of Ethiopia, some 80 ethnic groups were 
identified but the members of the House of Federation at the time were 64.104 
Hence, the constitutional guarantee that each nation, nationality or people shall 
be represented by a single member has not been put into practice. Due to the 
practical limitation that every ethnic group is not represented in the house, every 
decision is taken on a majority basis.105 The absence of veto powers for minority 
nationalities, even in matters strictly affecting their rights, makes it difficult for 
the House of Federation to adequately accommodate the rights of minorities. As 
the following paragraphs indicate, the issue of political participation of 
minorities at the federal level also deserves attention.
4.2 The Right to Political Participation of Ethnic Groups at the 
Federal Level
if one looks at the issue of the representation of minorities at the federal level in 
light of the need for political bargaining power for their rights, the seats 
guaranteed for them in the constitution will in effect play no role. Four ethnic 
groups (Amhara, Oromo, Somali, and Tigray) together form an overwhelming 
majority. If we see the case of the HoPR, elections to the house are conducted 
by means of general and direct elections under the first past the post electoral 
system.106 However, Article 54(3) of the Constitution provides for a guarantee 
of representation for minority nationalities and peoples by stipulating that at 
least 20 seats are reserved for these minorities out of the maximum number of 
550 seats. In accordance with the Constitution, unless otherwise provided, “all 
decisions of the house shall be by a majority vote of members present and 
voting”.107 The quorum requirement will be fulfilled upon the presence of more 
than half of the members of the house.108 In effect, the combined presence of the
103 Assefa Fishea, supra note 55, p. 275.
104 See, Aberra Dagafa , supra note 91, p. 96-100, 134-135.
105 Article 64 (1) of the FDRE Constitution.
106 See Article 54(2) of the FDRE Constitution.
107 Article 59(1) of the FDRE Constitution.
108 Article 58(1) of the FDRE Constitution.
four big nationalities in the house will suffice to legislate even in matters that 
affect the interests of other ethnic groups.
The same reasoning applies to the House of Federation which is also based 
on majoritarian rule because all decisions of the House require the approval of 
majority members present and voting. The quorum requirement is the presence 
at a meeting of two thirds of the members of the House.109 Unlike the HoPR, 
there are no guarantee seats to minority nationalities in the HoF. Each nation 
and people will have at least one member and will additionally be represented 
by one additional representative for each additional one million people.110 The 
larger the population size of an ethnic group, the higher the representation it will 
secure in the house and the higher is the risk of minorities being engulfed by the 
populous ethnic groups in the decision making process.
4.3 Regional Minorities: General Overview
There are more than eighty ethnic groups in the country, but nine regional states 
have been created. Not surprisingly, none of the nine regional states are 
ethnically homogenous.111 The Ethiopian federal system seems to have taken the 
assumption that every ethnic group inhabits a territorially defined geographical 
area.
Since the main objective of restructuring the country after 1991 was to 
address the issue of nationalities or ‘the nationality question’, ethnic groups (at 
least the major ones) were assigned specific regional states by which they are 
able to exercise their right of self-determination. In the process, the issues that 
arise from sub-national ethno-cultural diversity seem to have been overlooked.
Even though attempt has been made to match territorial autonomy with 
ethnic identity thereby creating homogenous states, the outcome is not as 
expected. All regional states of the Ethiopian federation, to a lesser or greater 
extent have an ethnically diverse population. The ethnic diversity that 
characterizes the federal level is also present at the regional level. Therefore, 
one may conclude that a perfect match between ethnic groups and territorial 
autonomy has not materialized as the drafters of the Constitution wished (and 
perhaps it may be impossible to do so). Rather, the act of drawing regional 
boundaries based on the major ethnic groups gave rise to the creation of 
minority ethnic groups in each of these regions.
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In terms of numerical superiority and political dominance of an ethnic group, 
the nine regional states can be classified in four categories. In the first category 
are five regional states in which the Tigray, Afar, Amhara, oromo and somali 
ethnic groups are dominant numerically as well as politically.112 In the second 
category is the state of the southern nations, nationalities and peoples with an 
amalgam of different ethnic groups. Although there is no numerical majority, it 
seems that not all ethnic groups within the regional state have equitable share in 
government power. In the third category is the regional state of Harar. Aalen 
considers it as “an anomaly in the Ethiopian federation”.113 The Harari regional 
state is formed in favor of the Harari ethnic group. What is surprising in this 
regional state is that the Harari are a numerical minority. However, they occupy 
the key political positions thereby making them politically dominant over other 
ethnic groups within the region.
in the fourth category are the multiethnic regional states of Benishangul 
Gumuz and Gambella. In the case of the former, the name of the region refers 
to the politically dominant ethnic groups of Berta and Gumuz.114 While no 
single ethnic group is a numerical majority in the region, the politically 
dominant indigenous nationalities numerically added together constitute a slight 
majority over other ethnic groups. In the case of the latter, the name Gambella 
does not have an ethnic correlation within members of the ethnic groups 
residing in the region. it is rather accorded a territorial name and not an ethnic 
one. The indigenous nationalities constitute a slight numerical majority over 
other ethnic groups and are also the politically dominant ones.
it is from the above modalities of regional state formations that the concept 
of regional minorities emanates. Thus, minority status at the regional level is 
determined due to lack of numerical majority as well as political dominance 
over the others or owing to the absence of political dominance irrespective of 
numerical foundations. Regional minorities under the Ethiopian context may be 
described as those groups which differ from the regionally dominant ethnic 
group. This dominance may be expressed in terms of political empowerment 
and/or numerical majority of an ethnic group. For example, the Amhara, Tigray, 
Afar, somali and oromo ethnic groups are the numerical majority as well as the 
politically dominant groups in their respective regions. in case of Harar, the 
numerical minority is the politically dominant section of the society, while in
112 See generally, Christophe Van der Beken (2007), “Ethiopia: Constitutional 
Protection of Ethnic Minorities at the regional level”, Afrika Focus, Vol. 20, No. 1-2,
113 Lovise Aalen (2002), Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant party State: The Ethiopian 
Experience 1991-2000, Bergen: Chr. Michelesen Institute, , p. 90
114 It is worth noting here that there are five indigenous Nationalities identified in the 
region. These are the Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao, and Como.
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Benishangul and Gambella there is no single numerical majority, though the 
indigenous nationalities are the politically dominant sections.
with the exception of a few, the regional states are carved in favor of the 
majority ethnic group. Hence, an Amhara who belongs to a majority in his own 
state will find himself reduced to minority status in Oromia region and vice- 
versa. This problem has not been dealt within the Constitution and what is 
worse, the exercise of government power in the regional states has been 
exclusionary for these minorities. The dominant (majority) ethnic group 
considers itself to be the owner of the regional state while other ethnic groups 
are relegated.115 This is exacerbated by the electoral law due to its adoption of 
the plurality system for a multi-ethnic country. This setting is described by some 
scholars as a condition of creating ‘local tyranny’.116
The denial of rights of regional minorities varies from being marginalized 
politically to economic relegation.117 The following section deals with these 
issues, particularly with respect to the political rights of regional minorities 
under the current electoral system.
5. The Right to Political Participation and Adequate 
Representation of Regional Minorities in Ethiopia
The concept of political participation, as part of minority rights, is premised on 
two major arguments. The first argument is that, the right to political 
participation of minorities “cannot be effectively ensured unless the minority 
actively partakes in the political decision-making process which governs the 
protection of its rights”.118 Secondly, “minorities run the risk of being excluded 
from the political system without special protective measures” especially in 
countries where most people likely vote for parties or candidates from their own 
ethnic groups.119 Furthermore, a number of approaches to democracy run the 
risk of permanently excluding minorities. Most obviously, the British style ‘first
115 The Constitution of the regional state of Oromia under its Article 8 which rests 
sovereign power solely on the Oromo people is an excellent account to this.
116 Assefa Fiseha, “Theory versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia’s Ethnic 
Federalism”, in David Turton (ed.) 2006, Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian 
Experience in Comparative Perspective (James Curry, Oxford), p. 136.
117 Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha and Christophe Van Der Beken, supra note 68, pp. 32-49.
118 Florian Bieber, Balancing Political Participation and Minority Rights: The 
Experience of the former Yugoslavia, available at
<www.netrouz.com/filedownload/florian/pdf.> Accessed on December 28, 2008.
119 Ibid.
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past the post electoral system which Ethiopia has endorsed has the feature of 
excluding minorities from representation within an electoral district.120
The Ethiopian federal system’s attempt to create ethnically homogenous sub­
national units has been frustrated by the existence of regional minorities 
scattered and/or concentrated in every regional state. All the regional states of 
Ethiopia are no exception to this pursuit of creating ethnically homogenous 
units. Despite the multiethnic character of the regions, the political representation 
of regional minorities in the regional state’s council has been problematic. For 
example, in the 2001 elections of Benishangul Gumuz, no representative from 
the non-indigenous communities121 was elected for the regional council and 
national parliament.122 Although 67% of the inhabitants in Assosa town, 43% in 
Assosa zone, 50% in Metekel zone and 20% in Kamashi Zone are from the non­
indigenous groups. However, they have not been represented in zonal and 
regional government structures, regardless of their citizenship rights.123 By the 
year 2005, there were 99 representatives in the regional parliament. The three 
populous indigenous nationalities held the lion’s share of seats in the regional 
parliament: the Berta had 41 seats, the Gumuz 35 and the Shinasha 11, the Mao 
and como each held two seats. only few leftover seats were taken up by the 
non-indigenous groups.
Moreover, these non-indigenous groups were severely curtailed in the 
exercise of their democratic rights to be elected in the regional legislative body, 
due to the electoral law of the country at the time, which stipulated that for an 
individual to be elected as a member of the regional state council he/she has to 
be proficient in one of the indigenous languages of the region.
The issue of political representation of the non-indigenous groups and the 
stipulation of the electoral laws has created bitter resentment amongst the non­
indigenous groups leading to petition to the House of the Federation. “Some 
even requested that they be repatriated to their former place of residence as most 
of them were made to settle in the region due to the Derg’s forced villagization 
and resettlement program”.124
120 Ibid.
121 These people are those who mostly arrived in the region due to the Derg’s program 
of villagization and resettlement. it also comprises of those who went to the region 
as migrant workers and established their livelihoods permanently in the region.
122 Berhanu G Balacha, Divide and Rule: Ethnic Federalism in Benishangul Gumuz 
Region of Ethiopia, available at, <www.ethiopolitic.com/pdfiles/divide and rule Dec 
21.2007.pdf.> Accessed on June 14, 2009, p. 4.
123 Ibid.
124 Getachew Assefa, “Federalism and Legal Pluralism in Ethiopia: Reflections on their 
Impacts on the Protection of Human Rights” in Girmachew Alemu and Sisay 
Alemahu (eds.) 2008, The Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia:
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5.1 The Demand for Adequate and Equitable Representation
The demand for adequate representation and the right to share political power by 
regional minorities in the regional states has been a slow but a rising process 
since the restructuring of the country based on ethnicity as a whole after 1991. 
This increasing claim reached its peak when Ethiopia’s electoral law provided 
for the criterion of language as a fundamental pre-requisite for political 
candidature. The problem eventually surfaced in the regional state of Benishangul 
Gumuz, when the regional minorities submitted their petition to the House of 
Federation. The issue in brief involved a tension between the region’s 
indigenous groups (Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Como and Mao) and that of the 
non-indigenous communities.125
The point of contention at the time was a decision by the regional state and 
the national election board, that for a person to be a candidate for a national or 
regional election, he/she should be able to speak at least one of the indigenous 
groups’ languages of the region.126 Particularly, the Berta political party at the 
time insisted that in the Bambasi woreda (district) of the Assosa zone, 
opposition candidates of the non-indigenous groups should not be allowed to 
run for office for none of them are versed in the Berta language. The party then 
subsequently petitioned to the National Electoral Board that they be cancelled 
from the election. The Board gave its decision based on the direct application of 
Article 38 of Proclamation No. 111/1995 which was the electoral law in force at 
the time and banned those running for office who cannot speak the local 
vernacular.127
The groups affected by the decision petitioned to the House of Federation 
that the decision of the Board violated their constitutional right to be elected 
which is granted to every citizen without any discrimination. They claimed that 
the wordings of Article 38(1) (b) of the Proclamation contravenes Article 38 of 
the FDRE Constitution, which grants every citizen the right to be elected 
without any discriminatory precondition attached to it. Hence, they demanded 
that the criterion of language be declared unconstitutional and null because it 
violates the provision of the Constitution. The following were the reliefs sought 
by the non-indigenous groups.
Challenges and Prospects, Ethiopian Human Rights Law Series, Vol.2 (Dec. 2008), 
pp. 12-14.
125 Assefa Fiseha (2007), Constitutional Adjudication in Ethiopia, 1 Mizan Law 
Review, (June 2007), p. 23.
126 This decision is premised on the argument that according to Proclamation No
111/1995 Article 38(1) (b) one of the criteria for candidature is being versed with the 
vernacular of the region of intended candidature.
127 Getachew Assefa, supra note, 124, p. 12-14.
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1. They demanded that they be fairly and equitably represented in the 
regional and national administrative organ hierarchies. It is interesting
also to note that the petitioners claimed to be recognized as distinct 
ethno-national groups in the region along with the five indigenous 
groups. Accordingly, they asserted that their right to self-determination 
under Article 39 of the FDRE Constitution be respected.
2. They demanded a special administrative status in the region so that they 
will be able to exercise self governance, or
3. Alternatively, they requested repatriation to the regions or places where 
they can have their rights respected and be able to preserve and develop 
their culture and language.128
But, the House only considered the language requirement for constitutional 
interpretation and stated that “the House focuses on issues of electing and being 
elected as other demands are responded by the regional and other executive 
bodies”.129 After having received advisory opinion from the Council of 
constitutional inquiry and professional recommendations, the House framed 
two issues for decision.130
1. Whether the language requirement to be eligible as a candidate under 
Article 38(1)(b) of Proclamation No. 111/1995 violates Article 38(1)(a) 
of the FDRE Constitution;
2. Whether the decision given by the Electoral Board is constitutional.
By a majority of 6 out of the 8 members, the advisory opinion of the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry submitted to the House stated that Article 38(1)(b) of 
Proclamation No. 111/1995 is unconstitutional. Disregarding this opinion, the 
House opined on the first issue that knowing the local (official) language with 
which the state council performs its duties can duly be used as a criterion for 
election and it declared Article 38(1)(b) of the Proclamation as constitutional. 
With regard to the second issue, however, the HoF declared the Electoral 
Board’s interpretation of the Proclamation unconstitutional because it required a 
candidate to be versed in one of the indigenous languages, particularly, the Berta 
language (one of the five indigenous languages spoken in the region) even 
though it is not the official language of the regional state.131
128 Ibid.
129 Decision of the House of Federation on ‘Constitutional Dispute Concerning the 
Right to Elect and being Elected in Benishangul Gumuz Regional state, 13 March 
2003, Available www.hofethiopia.org/HOF/HOF-constitutional-interpetation.htm
130 Ibid.
131ibid.
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5.2 Language as a Legitimate Requirement or a Barrier?
After the decision rendered by the HoF, the electoral law of the country 
underwent substantial amendments, the major one being Proclamation No. 
532/2007, which under Article 45(1)(b) embodied a specific provision similar to 
the decision rendered by the House.132 The Proclamation pursued the idea that 
language should be used as a legitimate requirement. The formulation under this 
Proclamation took the working language of the region or the local vernacular as 
an alternative requirement.133 The decision of the House of the Federation on the 
one hand and the electoral law on the other were understood in two differing 
ways.
a) In favour of the language requirement
The argument in favour of the electoral law applauds the decision rendered by 
the House of Federation, as a decision which attempted to strike a balance 
between the concerns of the different ethnic groups.134 Assefa argues that 
“saying simply that the language requirement is discriminatory and 
unconstitutional will be missing the fundamental virtue of not only the 
Ethiopian Constitution, which is apparently based on the free will of 
nationalities, but also the values of federalism, unity in diversity”.135
The other point worth considering in favour of the language requirement is 
that simple elimination of the language requirement for candidature will impair 
the rights of indigenous groups whose access to political power, the use of their 
language and associated cultural rights had been curtailed for long. “The very 
purpose in which the states of Harari, Gambella and Benishangul Gumuz have 
been created is for the purpose of ensuring the political dominance of the 
indigenous groups”.136 This is clear from the intention of the constitutional 
drafters in which they recognized only nine states despite the existence of more 
than eighty ethnic groups. If legitimate mechanisms of empowering these 
groups are not realized, then they will end up becoming subordinates and the 
whole purpose of national self-determination will not be served.
132
133
134
135
136
See, Proclamation 532/2007, Article 45(1)(b).
Ibid, Article 45(1) (b).
Assefa Fiseha, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 125, p. 28.
Id, 25.
Speech made by Dr. Gebreab , former Minister of State at the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs at the 1st National Conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, 
Addis Ababa, May 5-7, 2003 quoted in Assefa, Constitutional Adjudication, supra 
note 125, p. 26.
The Right of Minorities to Political Participation under the Ethiopian Electoral System 93
b) Against the language requirement
Those who strongly oppose the decision argue that “it is a reversal of past 
injustice which meets fire with fire as it tries to correct past discrimination with 
present discrimination rather than uproot discrimination in all of its forms”.137 
According to this view, the language requirement “is a move from one extreme 
to the other”.138
Under the new electoral law, being versed with the working language of the 
region or the language of the place of intended candidature is put as an 
alternative requirement implying that a candidate for instance, in Benishangul 
Gumuz who is well versed with the Berta language, can run for political office 
without the need to know the working language of the region which is 
Amharic.139 This will then be missing the whole purpose of the Proclamation. 
The reason behind the decision of the HoF was that if a member within a state 
council is not able to communicate fluently with the other members, then it will 
be very difficult for the council to conduct its normal transactions.140 But 
according to the Proclamation, since the working language and local vernacular 
are put as an alternative, a candidate who is well versed in the local vernacular 
can enter into the state council in Benishangul even if he does not know the 
working language of the region, which is Amharic.
The issue of regional minorities is another point at stake. Given the fact that 
none of the nine regional states are ethnically homogenous and minorities are 
already underprivileged in these regions, the addition of the language barrier 
will eventually lead to under-representation or no representation at all in their 
respective state councils.
The other strong argument against the language requirement is that “it is one 
which opens a door for subjective discrimination”.141 Since, the question of
137 Takele Soboka, “The Interplay of Equality Clause and Affirmative Action Measures 
under the Ethiopian Constitution: The Benishangul Gumuz Case and Beyond”, in 
Girmachew Alemu and Sisay Alemahu (eds.) 2008, The Constitutional Protection of 
Human Rights in Ethiopia: Challenges and Prospects, Ethiopian Human Rights Law 
Series, Vol. 2 (Dec. 2008), p. 94.
138 Ibid.
139 It is interesting to notice here that if a person joins the regional council without 
knowing its working language, what is the need for knowing the language of the 
region? Acquaintance with the working language was one of the grounds which the 
House of Federation considered in validating the language requirement of the 
Proclamation and in declaring the decision of the NEBE unconstitutional.
140 Decision of the HoF, supra note 129.
141 Cf Advisory opinion given by Ato Kifle Wodajo to the House of Federation on the 
constitutionality of Article 38 (1) (b) of Proclamation 111/1995 on file with the 
author.
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fluency in any language and the ability to use that language for different 
purposes requires factual determination in each case, there is a problem as to 
who is to make that determination and on what basis or criterion. Are all 
candidates running for an elective office in an electoral district to be subjected 
to a similar test? If so, who will be mandated to carry out the task of evaluating 
a candidate’s proficiency? Is such a determination to be conducted by the ethnic 
identification of the would-be candidate or is there any other objective standard 
for ascertaining the allegation/s that may arise against a would-be candidate? 
Does being versed, with the working language or the local vernacular include 
one’s ability to write only or to speak the language as well? what about cases of 
mutually intelligible languages where people are able to communicate with each 
other, without one not being well versed with the language of the other?142
Looking specifically at the case of Benishangul can illustrate the implications 
of the decision and the Electoral Law on the regional minorities found in the 
regional states. As mentioned earlier, the working language of the Benishangul 
Region (the language in which the activities of the regional state council are to 
be conducted) is Amharic. According to Article 45(1)(b) of Proclamation 
532/2007, a person will be eligible for candidature where he is versed either in 
the working language of the regional state or alternatively the language of 
his/her area of intended candidature.
In the case of the first requirement, since the working language of the 
regional state is Amharic, any person who is versed with the Amharic language 
can run for political office. But, the alternative condition is ambiguous. What 
does the area of intended candidature mean? Does it refer to the language of the 
region or the language of the specific electoral district in which one is running 
for political office? If we are to take the first modality as a way in which the 
wording “area of intended candidature” is to be interpreted, then regional 
minorities will not be the beneficiaries of the outcome. This is because regional 
minorities in most scenarios have a language different from the working 
language of the region except for regional states which have adopted Amharic as 
their working language.
If we are to take the second modality as the mechanism of interpretation then 
one has to know for sure what the language of the specific electoral district is. 
This may be construed form the fact that if there is the applicability of the 
“administration of nationalities” then the “area of intended candidature” could 
be the language adopted by the specific area of administration. However, such 
arrangements only exist in Amhara and SNNPR regional states.
Generally speaking, one can infer form the preceding arguments that the 
regional minorities in Benishangul (except the Amhara) which are not capable 
of speaking the Amharic language will not be eligible for electoral candidature.
142 Advisory opinion given by Ato Kifle Wodajo, Ibid.
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Submitting the issue again for constitutional interpretation will be a futile 
undertaking because, a decision given by the House has the effect of being a 
binding precedent for similar cases.143 Hence, at this point, the quest of these 
non-indigenous minorities for share of political power and adequate 
representation is something that will continue unless other mechanisms of 
political inclusion are put in place.
6. The Implications of the Electoral System for Elections at 
the Federal and Regional Levels
As has been described in the previous chapter, the four ethnic groups of Ethiopia 
(Amhara, Oromo, Tigray and Somali) together form an overwhelming majority. 
in addition to the existence of these four populous ethnic groups, the country is 
also inhabited by numerous and diverse ethnic groups. Hence, there is the need 
to adopt an electoral system which best suites this multiethnic character of the 
nation. “Since 1991, elections in Ethiopia are based on a plurality system of 
votes, with single-seat constituencies drawn on the basis of Woreda 
administrative units”.144
The Constitution has also adopted the same modality with respect to the 
House of Peoples Representatives. The House is composed of representatives of 
the country. Accordingly, elections to the House are conducted by means of 
general and direct elections under the first past the post electoral system.145 At 
the federal level, this implies that only an ethnic group which constitutes a 
majority in a region will be entitled to send its representatives, despite the 
presence of numerous minorities. For example, in the Amhara regional state the 
only representation will come from the Amhara ethnic group despite the 
existence of numerous regional minorities within it, because, the Amhara is the 
numerical majority within the region, unless consideration of minorities is made 
in setting up electoral constituencies.
This will also be the case in the multiethnic region of Benishangul and 
Gambella where the non-indigenous groups are relatively smaller in number 
than that of the indigenous ones. Hence, under the plurality (first past the post) 
system where absolute majority is not necessary, single vote supremacy can
143 See, Proclamation No 251/2001, Consolidation of the House of Federation and the 
Definition of its Powers and responsibilities Proclamation, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 
7th Year, No. 41, Addis Ababa, 6th July 2001, Article 11.
144 Tafesse Olika and Aklilu Abraham, “Legislation, Institutions and the Post 1991 
Elections in Ethiopia” in Kassahun Berhanu et.al.(eds), 2007, Electoral Politics, 
Decentralized Governance and Constitutionalism in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa 
University Press), p. 99.
145 Article 54(2) of the FDRE Constitution.
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determine the winner. Hence, not all ethnic groups will have their representation 
in the House of Peoples Representatives from their own place of residence. If 
that minority ethnic group has a state outside its place of residence, it might get 
a representation via that line although this cannot be called representation 
proper. Otherwise, ethnic groups which do not have a mother state and that 
cannot constitute a majority in an electoral district will be outside the ambit of 
representation in the House.146
The problem arises not only because of the modality of the electoral system 
adopted. it is also due to the small bargaining power of the states in the 
formulation of the electoral laws of the country. The power to enact laws 
concerning political parties and elections so as to give practical effect to the 
political rights provided in the Constitution is the duty of the federal 
government.147 This is done through the House of Peoples Representatives. This 
means, regional states are not entitled to formulate their own electoral system 
taking into consideration their population size, ethnic diversity and the long 
established communal relationships of their inhabitants. They only function 
within the emblem of an electoral law of the federal government. Since some 
regional states have a more diversified population than others, adopting a 
country-wide electoral system without a mechanism by which these states are to 
deal with their diversified population seriously affects the representation of 
minorities in the regional states.
Let us now see the implications of the electoral law in a diversified 
population. Proclamation No. 532/2007 clearly states that “[a] candidate who 
received more votes than other candidates within a constituency shall be 
declared the winner”.148 Most commentators agree that the plurality (first past 
the post) system is contrary to the principles of “pluralist multi-party 
democracy”.149
The winner takes all principle presents a significant problem in pluralistic 
societies, particularly where ethnic and cultural divisions have led to the 
formation of ethnic political parties and the division of the population along 
ethnic lines.150 In a multiethnic society, opting for the plurality system favours 
the majority by way of determining election results on the basis of a relative 
majority and reduces the chance of smaller and minority groups to be elected. 
The system exaggerates the representation of the winning party but fails to
146 However, it is worth noting here that they might secure a seat in the House of 
Peoples Representatives through minority nationality representation guaranteed 
under the constitution.
147 Article 51(15) of the FDRE Constitution.
148 Proclamation No 532/2007, Article 25.
149 Tafesse and Aklilu, supra note 144, p. 100.
150 Id, 101.
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reflect the various opinions of the voters in the elected assemblies. In other 
words, election results are decided on the basis of very few votes achieved 
relative to the total votes cast.151 This is particularly problematic for minority 
groups, which cannot constitute a majority in each and every electoral district.
In the first past the post electoral system, even a minimal majority is enough 
to gain a contested seat. In effect, proportional representation where smaller 
parties can get a voice without necessarily getting the highest number of votes in 
any of the electoral constituencies is avoided.152 In this respect, most 
commentators argue that the first past the post electoral system is not the ideal 
type for Ethiopia where national consensus is lacking among the competing 
parties and ethno-nationalist elites of the country.153 This also extends to 
elections conducted to the regional state councils, where the regions are 
composed of multiple ethnic groups.
7. Fortification by a Fitting Electoral System
The electoral system of Ethiopia, as has been shown above, has presented the 
different ethno-linguistic groups of the country with a lot of problems, 
especially in light of their ambition to an equitable and adequate share of 
political power in the respective federal and regional councils. Generally 
speaking, the British style first past the post electoral system is not the best 
approach to address the political rights of the different ethnic groups in 
multiethnic societies like Ethiopia. This will also apply to the multiethnic 
regional states within the federation. Even though, none of the Ethiopian 
federated states can be described as homogenous, some of them are more 
diverse in their ethnic compositions than the others. Especially, the Benishangul 
Gumuz, SNNPR and Gambella regional states are multiethnic regions within a 
multiethnic country.
Moreover, the electoral constituencies have not been subject to change as per 
the new electoral law of the country. The functioning constituencies are thus the 
ones that are already set up by taking into consideration the 100,000 population. 
The new electoral law, which stipulates that electoral constituencies shall be 
established taking into consideration population size of the country has not been 
implemented. Despite the variation that has appeared within the formerly setup 
electoral constituencies, this has simply been neglected.
The new electoral constituencies should be established based on the new 
electoral law of the country, and this should take into consideration the
151 Ibid.
152 Merera Gudina (2003), Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalism and the Quest for 
Democracy 1960-2000 (Shaker publishing), p.133.
153 Ibid.
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significant numerical presence of regional minorities (i.e. they should not 
always be made minorities in each electoral district). This needs some sort of 
gerrymandering which warrants redrawing the map of the electoral districts to 
serve the purpose of all ethnic groups in the regional states. This implies that 
electoral districts should be drawn up, especially in areas where the regional 
minorities are found territorially concentrated so that constituencies could be 
established in a manner that they will constitute numerical majorities in 
constituencies. This will particularly address the needs of regional minorities 
even within the first past the post electoral system since they can constitute a 
numerical majority on a particular district.
Taking into consideration the country’s long history of competing ethnic 
nationalisms and lack of consensus, the best option is to adopt the proportional 
representation system at the federal as well as at regional level of government 
structure. This is because, in the proportional system of representation, a 
contested seat will not simply be won by a simple majority vote, but rather, it 
will be distributed among candidates, proportionately; in accordance with the 
percentage of votes they have secured.
This can be achieved by one of the following two mechanisms. The first one 
is amending the stipulation of the FDRE Constitution which embodies the first 
past the post electoral system and putting in place the proportional representation 
system. But this may be a very remote ambition, because, since the adoption of 
the FDRE Constitution, not a single provision has been amended or struck out.
The other option is amendment of the electoral law of the country, especially, 
the section which deals with the electoral system. This could be done without 
the total rejection of the plurality system. The former system can be used to 
elections conducted at the federal level, i.e. to the HoPR, while in the case of the 
latter, states would be allowed to devise their own electoral systems in 
accordance with their own specific needs. In regional states where there exists a 
huge presence of ethnic diversity, it could be stipulated that for the purpose of 
conducting elections to the regional state council, the proportional representation 
mechanism could be used. This enables the regional minorities to secure a seat 
in the regional state councils proportionate to their population size without 
requiring them to constitute a numerical majority in each electoral constituency.
it cannot a priori be said that a certain type of electoral system is preferable 
to another. Each individual case calls for its own solution. Nevertheless, under a 
scheme of single electorate like the case in Ethiopia, the choice of an electoral 
system should be made based on whether the country has a communal or inter 
communal party system.154 Laponce notes the following:
154 Laponce, supra note 73, p. 338.
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If there is a system in which majority and minority collaborate in the same 
political parties, majority systems should be favored by the minority in so far 
as it tends to the creation of a two-party system in which the minority group 
has a greatly increased bargaining position. However, if there is a communal 
party system, that is to say, a system in which, because of the minority’s own 
choice or because of the majority’s hostility, the parties are built along 
communal lines, proportional representation is to be preferred.155
This, exactly is, the case in Ethiopia. Therefore, the plurality system in general 
should be replaced by the proportionality system. But in cases where it is not 
possible to realize such an undertaking, both can be utilized complementarily. 
This can be achieved by granting states the right to devise their own electoral 
systems as per their own needs, subject to a general framework that stipulates 
the ground norms.
Concluding Remarks
The preceding sections have assessed the interplay of the electoral system in the 
context of Ethiopia’s current ethnic federal structure. Particular assessment is 
made on the notions of electoral systems and ethnic minorities. The viability of 
political representation of minorities has been highlighted from the point of an 
electoral system functioning within an ethnic federal structure. This issue has 
been evaluated under the premise that, only nine regional states have so far been 
formed, despite the existence of more than eighty ethnic groups.
The Electoral Law and the setting up of electoral constituencies (especially 
for the purpose of representation at the regional council level) have played a 
significant role in hindering different ethnic groups, especially regional 
minorities, from securing adequate representation proportional to their 
numerical presence. This is mainly because the 'first past the post electoral 
system declares the winner by a simple majority of votes, and in effect reduces 
the rights of regional minorities, and minorities also constitute a numerical 
minority in most of the electoral constituencies.
The Electoral Law’s stipulation of language as a legitimate criterion for 
political candidature has also presented the different regional minorities with a 
huge barrier to compete for political representation. A political candidate who 
runs for political office has either to know the working language or the local 
vernacular (the indigenous language) of the region. This will, in effect mean that 
other regional minorities, who know neither Amharic nor the local vernacular of 
the region, cannot run for political candidature. This stipulation of the electoral 
law erodes constitutionally guaranteed political, linguistic and cultural rights.
155Id, 338-339.
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With respect to electoral constituencies, they should strictly be demarcated 
by taking population size as stipulated in the electoral law of the country. 
Meanwhile, due consideration should be made to the interest of all ethnic groups 
especially the rights of minorities for equitable representation, and that electoral 
constituencies are not always drawn contrary to their interests. Taking into 
consideration the numerical presence of minorities in the region, constituencies 
should be drawn to allow them to be majorities within some constituencies.
Due attention should also be given to the demand for equitable representation 
in the electoral system and the setting up of electoral constituencies. The ‘first 
past the post system, as outlined earlier excludes minorities from political 
representation and may at times understate combined majority votes. Therefore, 
the proportional representation system should be adopted either replacing the 
already existing system or in combination with it. To this end, regional states 
should be allowed to devise and adopt the electoral system suitable to them 
taking into consideration the diversity and need of their population. However, 
pursuits of embracing the proportional system require deeper study on the 
particularities of every ethnic group and the need of the country in general, and 
in effect, such pursuits call for series of national dialogues. ______ ■
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